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Article 7

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

The Rule Against Contribution
And Its Status In Nebraska
It is the purpose of this article to present two distinct phases
of the law of contribution between joint tortfeasors. The first section includes a brief summary of the background for the "no contribution" rule along with a discussion of a recent case which relaxes the stringent requirements for recovery. The second section
deals exclusively with the Nebraska law on this issue and endeavors
to determine Nebraska's exact position as to the allowance of contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors.
I. THE RULE IN GENERAL
The starting point for any discussion of the law of contribution
is the famous English case of Merryweather v. Nixan,1 holding that
an intentional tortfeasor compelled to pay the full amount of the
victim's damages cannot subsequently force his fellow intentional
wrongdoers to pay their pro rata shares. The case rests solely and
simply on the notion that a court should leave such culpable persons where it finds them. The "no contribution between joint tortfeasors" rule has, in England, 2 never been extended to negligent
tortfeasors and for a time it appeared as though American law
would similarly refuse to extend it. 3 Later, however, after joinders
became commonplace, American courts lost sight of the true basis
for the rule and held that no contribution would lie notwithstanding
that the joint tortfeasors were merely negligent. This is the law
in most of the states today.

Rep. 186 (1799). Although the Merryweather case is commonly
cited for the formation of the rule against contribution this decision was

18 Term.

preceded by Battersey's case, Winch's Rep. 48, by Common Pleas (1623).
See Reath, Contribution Between Persons, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 176 (1898)
for a discussion of this case. The famous Highwayman's case, Everet v.
Williams, Ex. (1725) was also prior to the Merryweather holding. In the
Everet case two thieves appeared before the court for a division of
their plunder. The court held the plaintiff's attorney in contempt, fined
one attorney, deported the other and had both the Plaintiff and the Defendant beheaded. See 9 L.Q. Rev. 197 (1893).
2 See Lord Herschell's opinion in Palmer v. Wick & Pultneytown Steam
Shipping Co., 1894 A.C. 318. Contribution is now provided by statute
in England. Salmond, Law of Torts, 8th Ed. (1934).
3
Horbach's Adm'rs v. Elder, 6 Harriss 33, 18 Pa. 33 (1851) and Nickerson
v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295 (1875).

COMMENTS
Courts in this country have seldom sought to justify the "no
contribution" rule as applied to negligent joint tortfeasors. The
only condition adverted to in these cases, other than prior authority,
is that the very harshness of the rule serves as an added deterrent
to wrongdoing. Conveniently overlooked is the fact that joint tortfeasors, against whom contribution is denied, are permitted to
escape the consequences of their wrongdoing.
Contribution arose in equity and is based on the theory of
equality of burden and the doctrine of unjust enrichment.4 The
social considerations for allowing recovery in these cases seem to
heavily outweigh those arguments in opposition. The failure to
allow contribution will undoubtedly promote fraud and collusion.
A possible agreement between the suing plaintiff and one of the
tortfeasors is not impossible to foresee. The "no contribution" rule
is unjust in its treatment of the defendant. He is not totally at
fault for the injured party's damages and yet is forced to pay the
full amount of such damages. The whim of the plaintiff is the
controlling factor in these cases. Should we allow such private
arbitration rather than submit to the more practical and equitable
judicial arbitration? The refusal to allow contribution is also inconsistent with reality and the modern theory of indemnity, where
the passive tortfeasor is allowed complete relief.
Negligent tortfeasors in these cases are much like the passive
tortfeasor in the indemnity case in that his liability is discharged
by large insurance companies or under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. The courts should allow these insurers to adjust the loss
distribution accordingly.
The rule barring contribution between negligent tortfeasors is
being steadily rejected in this country. In 1939 the first Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was submitted for adoption.5
The first state to adopt the Uniform Act was Rhode Island in 19400
and subsequently seven other jurisdictions have called for its acceptance.7 Legislative repeal or modification of the "no contribu4

Arnold, Suretyship and Guaranty, at 270 (1927), 'quality
as well as of the benefits is the basis for its recognition."
59 Uniform Laws Ann. 230 (1957).
6 Gen Laws of R.I. (1956), §§ 10-6-1 to 10-6-11.
7 Arkansas: Ark. Stat., §§ 34-001 to 34-009, in 1941.

of burden

Delaware: Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 6308, in 1949.

Hawaii: Rev. Laws Hawaii (1955), c.246, §§ 10 to 16, in 1941.
Maryland: Ann. Code of Md. (1957), Art. 50, §§ 16 to 24, in 1941.
New Mexico: New Mex. Ann. Stat. (1953), Art. 24, §§ 1-11 to 1-24, in 1941.
Pennsylvania: Purdon's Penna Stat., Tit. 12, §§ 2082 to 2089, in 1951.

South Dakota: S. Dak. Code (Supp. 1952), c. 33.04A, in 1945.
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tion" rule has taken place in many other states8 although the courts
of a slight majority still refuse to allow contribution. 9 As the rule
appears to be well settled in these jurisdictions it is up to the various
legislatures to provide for pro rata loss distribution between joint
tortfeasors.
In those states allowing contribution, either by statute or at
common law, three distinct prerequisites emerge before recovery
sThe following states allow contribution in some form by statute.
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann., Tit. 105, §§ 2011 to 2012 (1935).
Kansas: Gen. Stat. of Kansas, c. 60, § 3437 1949).
Kentucky: Kent. Rev. Stat., c. 412.030 (1956).
Louisiana: Civil Code of La., Art. 2103-2104 (1952).
Michigan: Mich. Stat. Ann., vol. 22, §§ 27.1683 (1) and (4) (1954).
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann., §548.19 (1948).
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann., § 335.5 (1956).
Missouri: Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat., §537.060 (1953).
Montana: Rev. Codes of Mont., §59-511 (1947) and see Beedle v. Carolan,
115 M. 587, 590, 148 P.2d 559. Although the statute does not expressly
cover the joint tortfeasor situation, the court implies that it may be
interpreted to include such a problem.
New Jersey: N.J.S.A. 2A: 53A-3 (1952).
New York: Consol. Law of N.Y. Ann., Bk. 12, §§ 231-240 (1928).
North Carolina: Gen. Stat. N.C., §1-240 (1955).
Texas: Vernon's Tex. Stat. Ann., Art. 2212 (1941).
Virginia: Code of Va., §8-627 (1950).
West Virginia: W. Va. Code Ann., §5482 (1955).
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann., c. 113.01 (1955).
Puerto Rico has also enacted a statute allowing contribution between joint
tortfeasors. Laws of Puerto Rico, Tit. 32, §1149 (1955).
The following are cases in some of those states that refuse to allow contribution in the absence of a statute to the contrary:
Arizona: United States v. State of Arizona, 214 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1954).
Connecticut: Friend v. Middle AtI. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2nd Cir.
1946).
Iowa: American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950).
Oklahoma: Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,
215 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1956).
Tennessee: Fontenot v. Roach, 120 F.Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1954), contribution not allowed except in cases where one tortfeasor is active and
one is passive. This appears to be indemnity.
Illinois: Aldridge v. Morris, 337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N.E.2d 143 (1949) and
see Gulf M. & O.R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co.,343 Ill. App. 148,
98 N.E.2d 783 (1951), for exceptions to the general rule.
Virginia: American Emp. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Col, 218 F.2d (4th Cir.
1954). In Virginia contribution is allowed only if the tortfeasor is
guilty of negligence and there is no moral turpitude involved. See Virginia statute cited in note 8.
Ohio: Maryland Cas. Co. v. Gough, 146 Ohio St. 305, 65 N.E.2d 858 (1946).
Oregon: Jackman v. Jones, 198 Ore. 564, 258 P.2d 133 (1953).
Utah: Hardman v. Mathews, 1 Ut.2d 110, 262 P.2d 748 (1953).

COMMENTS
will be allowed. The first of these is that there must be a discharge
of the obligation to the injured party.10 The Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act requires a discharge:
A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has
paid more than his pro rata share thereof."
The second requirement, which is recognized in a few states,
is that the injured party must acquire a judgment against both
tortfeasors before one can sue for contribution. 12 The effect of this
requirement is to bar contribution in most cases. Some courts have
expressly rejected the joint judgment requirement 13 and it should
be noted that it could operate to throw the discretion back onto
the injured party as in the case where contribution is not allowed
at all.

The third and most important prerequisite to the allowance of
contribution in these cases is that there must be a common burden.

By common burden it is meant that both tortfeasors must have
contributed to the injury and that they must both be jointly liable
to the injured party.14 A tortfeasor's recovery of contribution from
a joint tortfeasor presupposes a common liability of the tortfeasors
to the injured party.' 5 Contribution has been denied for a failure
to meet the common burden requirement where the tortfeasor from
whom recovery was sought had a personal defense due to: the defendant being the plaintiff's father,1 6 the plaintiff's assumption of
the risk of the defandant's negligence, 7 the defendant having paid
workmen's compensation to the plaintiff, 8 the injured party failing to give the required notice and hence, the statute of limitations
10American Auto Ins. Co. v. Molling, 238 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d 847 (1953),
Western Cas. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 251 N.W.
491 (1933), Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926) and Knell v.
Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
"19 Uniform Laws Ann. 230 (1957), § 2 (2).
12Murtagh v. Phillips Wase Oil Pick-Up and Road Oiling Service Inc. 17
F.R.D. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1955); Franklin v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 953
(N.D. W.Vir. 1954) and Linkenhoger v. Owens, 181 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1950).
13 Yellow Cab Co. of D.C. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
14 Supra note 13, and Jackson Co. v. Norfolk, 197 Va. 62, 87 S.E.2d 781 (1955).
15 LoBue v. United States, 188 F.2d 800 (2nd Cir. 1951).
16 Zutter v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229 N.W. 74 (1930).
17 Shrofe v Rural Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 258 Wis. 128, 45 N.W.2d 76 (1950).
'SBuggs v. Wolff, 201 Wis. 533, 230 N.W. 621 (1930) and Wis. Power and
Light Co. v. Dean, 275 Wis. 236, 81 N.W.2d 486 (1957).
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running, 9 and finally where the United States had not yet consented to be sued as a tortfeasor and thus contribution could not
20
Although most of
be allowed as there was no common liability.

the decisions as to the prerequisites for allowing contribution arise
under various statutes giving a right of contribution between joint
tortfeasors, those states that recognize the right at common law
also base the allowance on a common burden. 21 Decisions under
are numerous and in accord. In Guerriero v. U-Drive-It
statutes
22
Co.,

the court stated:

* . . there must be liability in tort before the statute can become
operative ... the element of common liability of both tortfeasors

to the injured person, essential to the right of contribution, is
lacking....

The New Jersey court refused to allow contribution because of the
lack of common liability and its opinion serves as a model of the
many other decisions on the subject.
The stringent requirement of a common burden has been recently relaxed in favor of the innocent party who mistakenly makes
a settlement, thinking himself to be liable, and thereafter sues the
true tortfeasor for contribution. In the recent case of Rusch v.
Korth,2 3 the plaintiff was injured while riding in an automobile
driven by one Heimerl when it collided with another car driven by
Korth. Plaintiff sued Korth who alleged that the accident was
caused by Heimerl's negligence and also demanded contribution in
case plaintiff should recover against her. On the day of the trial

19Palmer v. Autois Mut. Ins. Co., 234 Wis. 287, 291 N.W. 364 (1940). This
case, although once representing the law as the Statute of Limitations,
has since been overruled by Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W.2d
790, 35 N.W.2d 911 (1949). The majority rules concerning these defenses
are expressed in 19 A.L.R.2d 1003.
20

Oahu Ry. and Land Co. v. United States, 73 F.Supp. 707 (Hawaii 1947),
citing Baltimore Transit Co. v. Maryland, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858, 156
A.L.R. 460 (1944).
21 Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926). Wisconsin now allows
contribution by statute. See Snohomish County v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 130 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1942), where contribution is allowed if the act
is not immoral, providing a common burden exists. See Yellow Cab Co.
of D.C. v. Dreslin, supra, note 13.
22 22 N.J. Super. 588, 92 A.2d 140 (1952) in interpreting N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-15. See Walker v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W.
721 (1934); American Auto Ins. Co. v. Molling, supra, note 10; Connecticut
Indem. Co. v. Prunty, 263 Wis. 27, 56 N.W.2d 540 (1953); and Jackson Co.
v. Norfolk, supra, note 14.
23 2 Wis.2d 321, 86 N.W.2d 464 (1957).
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Korth settled with the plaintiff, who executed full and complete
releases. At the trial Korth sought to show that Heimerl was casually negligent and further objected to evidence showing that she
was negligent. The jury found that Heimerl was negligent and
that Korth was not. Korth then requested the court to find her
casually negligient so as to entitle her to contribution as a joint
tortfeasor. The motion was denied and Korth appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Held: Judgment reversed with directions
to enter judgment for contribution, notwithstanding the absence
of negligence on the part of Korth.
Thus the accepted requirement of resting the right to contribution between joint tortfeasors on a showing of common liability
has been modified in Wisconsin. 24 The court stated that their decision accords with the equitable basis for allowing contribution and
was in agreement with the sound policy of encouraging settlements.
The majority opinion mentions several earlier Wisconsin cases that
appear to be based on reasoning inconsistent to the present holding
but restricts those cases to their own facts. 25 One of the cases referred to is Papenfus v. Shell Oil Co. 26 Here it was held that a payment made to the injured party by the insurance carrier of an
impleaded defendant, later found to be free of negligence, was
a voluntary contribution. The amount could not be deducted from
the judgment in favor of the injured party against the true tortfeasor. The theory underlying these decisions appears to be contrary although they can be distinguished in that the innocent party
is suing for contribution in the Korth case and the real tortfeasor
is suing for a deduction in the Papenfus case. This distinction appears to be unsound and in the Papenfus case the court is unrealistic in calling the payment a voluntary contribution. The distinguished Professor Warren A. Seavey, in delivering the third of the
Roscoe Pound Lectures at the University of Nebraska College of
Law, submitted this contention and also stated that the desirability
of allowing contribution in these cases is almost beyond argument.2 7
The first question to come before the court in the Korth case
was whether Korth was a mere volunteer and therefore not en24

Michel v. McKenna, 199 Wis. 608, 227 N.W. 396 (1929), and Zutter v. 0'Connell, supra, note 16. These cases were not specifically overruled but
the reasoning behind them seems contrary to the present decision.
25 See Rusch v. Korth, supra, note 23 at page 32.
26 254 Wis. 233, 35 N.W.2d 920 (1949).
27
Cogitations on Torts, pp. 53-55, Third Roscoe Pound Lecture, University
of Nebraska College of Law, March 23-25, 1953.
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titled to recovery.28 A volunteer is one who does or undertakes to
29
do that which he is not legally or morally bound to do. The court
rejected this argument and held that she was not a volunteer as
she had a real interest to protect in payment of the settlement.
This reasoning is based on those cases which have held that one
is not a mere volunteer if there is a bona fide claim of interest, but
it must be shown that the party had, or supposed he had, some
interest to be protected. 30 An analogy can also be drawn to those
cases where payment of the debt of another, by reason of a mistake
of fact, has been held not to bar recovery under the volunteer doctrine.31 These decisions are based on the theory that the court will,
in good conscience, not allow the real debtor to take advantage of
the mistake of the plaintiff.
The second question to arise in the Korth case was that of

common liability. The logical reasoning in this case, with reference
to the existing rules concerning contribution, would seem to be that
Korth was free of negligence and such a complete defense would
bar any common liability and hence, recovery of contribution. The
court discussed at length the equitable basis of contribution and
cited the earlier case of Ainsworth v. Berg,3 2 where it permitted
contribution between the wrongdoers notwithstanding that one
had a complete defense to an action by the injured plaintiff. This
decision formed the foundation for the Korth opinion and the two
cases stand as an exception to the general requirement of a common
burden. They are based on the principle that contribution is an
equitable remedy and equity should be served in its execution.
An example of the harshness of a failure to note this exception
occurred in Charlotte, North Carolina, where a pedestrian was injured by falling on a sidewalk. He subsequently obtained a judgment from the city, who then sought to recover from the abutting
property owners, under the Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors
Act. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the city had
not alleged any negligence on their part And therefore was not a
Holding that a volunteer may not recover are: Gosnell v. Garner, 198
Ark. 989, 132 S.W.2d 187, 189 (1939) and In Re Bell, 344 Pa. 223, 25 A.2d
344, 350 (1942).
29
White v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 142 Minn. 50, 170 N.W. 849 (1919).
30 Boney v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. of Chicago, 213 N.C. 563, 197 S.E. 122
(1938), quoting from Journal Publishing Co. v. Barber, 165 N.C. 478, 81
S.E. 694, 697 (1914).
31 Detroit Bldg. &Loan Ass'n v. Oram, 200 Mich. 485, 167 N.W. 50 (1918) and
28

Lee v. Newell, 96 Neb. 209, 147 N.W. 684 (1914).
32

253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W.2d 790, 35 N.W.2d 911 (1949).
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joint tortfeasor under the statute. 33 Contribution was refused due
to the absence of a common burden. The problem in this case seems
identical to that in Rusch. v. Korth,34 with the courts of the two
states reaching opposite conclusions.
As the courts of the several jurisdictions seem reluctant to
overrule those cases that require a common burden, another possibility might be suggested. Although it has not been referred to
in these cases, the doctrine of equitable subrogation may be invoked. The party seeking recovery in this instance is not a volunteer and the obligation was paid for the purpose of protecting some
real or supposed interest of his own. The use of this doctrine is
highly favored by the courts and might prove to be a method
whereby the requirement
of common liability in contribution cases
35
could be preserved.
The possibility of the decision in Rusch v. Korth 36 becoming
a new trend seems highly unlikely, but as the theory of contribution between joint tortfeasors was founded in equity the strict
rules applied in some cases seem to be without justification.
II. CONTRIBUTION IN NEBRASKA
Nebraska has no statute authorizing contribution and the
cases discussing the problem are controversial. It has been submitted that the Supreme Court of Nebraska would allow contribution as between negligent tortfeasors on the basis of past decisions. 37 The Nebraska Supreme Court has recognized the negligent

tortfeasor exception to the "no contribution" rule along with the
general requirements for recovery. Whether they have in fact
allowed contribution in these cases is questionable,38 but the "no
contribution" rule has never been upheld in Nebraska.
The first case involving contribution between joint tortfeasors
33

Charlotte v. Cole, 223 N.C. 106, 25 S.E.2d 407 (1943) interpreting N.C.
Code Ann., § 618 (1939).
34
Supra, note 23.
35 See 50 Am. Jur., p. 693, § 15. An excellent note in 22 N.C. L. Rev. 167,
suggests equitable subrogation as a possibility in these cases.
3
6Supra, note 23.
37George's Radio Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
citing First Nat. Bank v. Avery Planter Co., 69 Neb. 329, 95 N.W. 622,
625, 111 Am. St. Rep. 541 (1903).
38
Compare the statement of Groner, C.J. in George's Radio Inc. v. Capital
Transit Co., supra, note 37, with the opinion of Delehant J. in Andromidas
v. Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb. 1950).
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that arose in Nebraska was Johnson v. Torpy.39 A saloon-keeper
sold intoxicating liquors to the deceased husband which caused,
or contributed to, his death. The wife of the deceased sued the
saloon-keeper, under a then effective statute permitting recovery,
and acquired a judgment. The saloon-keeper now sues another
saloon-keeper, who also sold liquor to the deceased, for contribution. The lower court allowed recovery and there was an appeal.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the plaintiff tortfeasor was presumed to have known that his act was wrongful
and he therefore stood in the position of an intentional tortfeasor.
It should be noticed that in this case the presumption of knowledge
and intent was put upon the plaintiff because of his violation of
the statute and also because he knew the deceased to be a habitual
drunkard. Where the plaintiff is put in the position of an intentional
tortfeasor, contribution has not been allowed. 40 Although recovery
was not allowed in Johnson v. Torpy, the court expressly recognized the right of contribution between negligent tortfeasors. In
referring to the test for recovery in these cases the court stated:
In determining whether the right of contribution exists in favor
of one wrong-doer against another the test is, must the party demanding contribution be presumed to have known that the act
for which he has been compelled to respond was wrongful? If not,
he may recover 41
against one equally culpable, but otherwise he is
without remedy.
This appears to be a forceful argument for the suggestion that the
Nebraska Supreme Court would, if the facts warranted such a
finding, allow recovery between negligent joint tortfeasors.
In Sharp v. Call,42 the court was faced with a request for contribution by a trustee of an insolvent corporation who had wrongfully distributed corporate assets and was required to account to
the creditors for the amount of such distribution. The court found
the plaintiff must be presumed to have known it was a wrongful
act. In disposing of the case on the basis of presumed knowledge
and therefore barring negligence, the court made the following
statement:
If the action . .. is tortious, and the plaintiff must be presumed
to have known that it was a wrong-doing, then it would seem
that there can be no recovery in this case. On the other hand,

39 35 Neb. 604, 53 N.W. 575 (1892).
40
Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed., p. 249.
41 Johnson v. Torpy, supra, note 39, at p. 606. This case was later affirmed
in another opinion by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Torpy v. Johnson,
42

43 Neb. 882, 62 N.W. 253 (1895).

69 Neb. 72, 95 N.W. 16, 96 N.W. 1004 (1903).
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if the action was taken in good faith, and with defendants participation, and plaintiff need not be pressured to43 have known it
was wrong, there would be a right to contribution.
By using the words "good faith" the court would seem to imply
that a tortfeasor who was merely negligent might recover contribution from his fellow tortfeasor. Sedgwick J., in dissent, felt that
the plaintiff had acted in good faith and should be allowed to recover. He apparently felt that the plaintiff "has at all times taken
such action as an honorable and intelligent business man would
ordinarily be expected to take.... .", and that he would therefore be
merely negligent and should not be presumed to have known that
his actions were wrongful. 44 Thus it again appears that Nebraska
judges have demonstrated a preference for the allowance of contribution between joint tortfeasors where their acts were of a
negligent character.
In a later case, First National Bank v. Avery Planter Co., 45
attaching creditors joined with the sheriff in resisting an action
brought by a party whose goods were seized under a wrongful attachment order. By joining in this defense they were found to
have become joint tortfeasors. The Supreme Court, in allowing
contribution,made the following statement:
The general rile that contribution among tortfeasors will not

be enforced, does not apply where, as in this case, the Darties acted
in good faith without any intention of committing a trespass.46
The court made mention of the fact that the right to contribution
results from natural equity and that its enforcement is an application of the principle, that one should be compelled to do that, which,
in equity and good conscience, he ought to do; and in conclusion
stated:
We conclude, therefore, that the defendant is entitled to contribution for the amount paid by it in discharge of the judgment, and
the reasonable expense incurred in defense of the action... .47

Additional litigation under this factual situation arose in
Schappel v. First National Bank.48 The court affirmed the judgment of the district court which followed the ruling in the Avery
Sharp v. Call, supra, note 42, at pp. 75, 76.
Sharp v. Call, supra, note 42, at p. 77.
45 69 Neb. 329, 95 N.W. 622 (1903).
46 First Nat. Bank v. Avery Planter Co., supra, note 45, at p. 337 citing
Johnson v. Torpy, supra, note 39.
47
First Nat. Bank v. Avery Planter Co., supra, note 45, at p. 338.
48 80 Neb.708, 115 N.W.317 (1908).

43
44
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Planter case. 40 Duffie, C., writing the majority opinion expressed
doubt as to whether the evidence warranted a finding that the
other parties joined the bank in resisting the action brought against
the sheriff. He pointed out that such a finding could be the only
basis on which the bank had all, if not more than all, it was entitled
to receive.
Although it appears that the establishment of joint liability
may have been in doubt in the Avery Planterand Schappel cases,
the fact remains that contribution was allowed in the Avery decision and it was allowed on the basis of the wrongdoers acting in
good faith and as joint tortfeasors.
In these cases the courts mention the term "good faith." In
an effort to defeat the contention that Nebraska has recognized
the right of recovery as between negligent tortfeasors it could be
suggested that the failure to mention negligence demonstrates an
intent to limit that recognition only to cases where the wrongdoer
acted in good faith. This distinction has not been made in any of
the Nebraska opinions and as a negligent tortfeasor must necessarily
be acting in good faith, the cases should not be distinguished in
this manner. Good faith and negligence, as stated here, are used
in the same context.
The opposite view as to Nebraska's status on this issue is expressed in an excellent opinion written by Judge Delehant in Andromidas v. Theisen Bros.5° After a careful examination of the
Nebraska authorities in point the learned judge suggested that the
Nebraska Supreme Court has not, in any of its opinions, sustained
the right of contribution between joint tortfeasors. In deciding the
issue, Judge Delehant made this statement:
Measured by the test proposed in Johnson v. Torpy, supra, this
court thinks that the negligent user of the state's public highways-or any other party guilty of actual and actionable negigence-should 'be presumed to have known that the act for which
he has been compelled to respond was wrongful.' It is elemental
that persons are presumed to contemplate and intend the natural
and probable consequences of their own acts. 51
The judge has placed all negligent tortfeasors in the position of
intentional actors and thereby destroyed their right of contribution.
It is not disputed that contribution will not be allowed to intentional
tortfeasors. In concluding that Nebraska had never allowed contribution in these cases and in an effort to overcome the ruling in
49 Supra, note 45.

G0 94 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb. 1950).
51 Supra, note 87, at p. 156.
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First National Bank v. Avery Planter Co.,?2 Judge Delehant quoted
the commissioner in Schappel v. FirstNational Bank,53 who had also
written the opinion in the Avery Planter case, and concludes that
the commissioner "damned with faint praise, '54 his former action
in awarding the bank contribution. It remains that, despite the
doubt expressed by the commissioner, contribution was allowed.
Does the interpretation suggested in the Andromidas case evince
that every negligent tortfeasor should, in all cases for the purpose
of deciding contribution, "be presumed to have known that the
act for which he has been compelled to respond was wrongful,"
and therefore be refused contribution? If this be the situation how
could contribution ever be allowed? What becomes of the negligent
tortfeasor and would we be forced to revert to the old and outmoded
rule denying contribution in all cases where joint tortfeasors are
involved?
Although Nebraska has never passed a statute allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors there have been two efforts at
getting such a proposal enacted. In 1953, Ralph Svoboda, a member
of the Legislature from Omaha, proposed LB 472.55 The bill was
very much like the Uniform Act. 0 Along with Senator Svoboda,
Professor H. H. Foster of the University of Nebraska appeared as
a proponent of LB 472. They pointed to the outmoded concept behind the common law refusal to allow contribution, the economy of
time that would be achieved in allowing one suit to settle the responsibilities of all parties, and finally, the possibility of putting
a stop to connivance and collusion between parties trying to settle
their own law suits.
Again in 1955 Senator Svoboda presented a similar proposal to
the Legislature in the form of LB 487,57 which would allow contribution between joint tortfeasors. He advised that the Nebraska
State Bar Association recommended adoption and also that the bill
had the approval of Dean James Doyle of the Creighton Law School.
Dean David Dow, who was at that time Dean of the Nebraska College of Law, spoke in favor of the bill. No one appeared in opposition to LB 487 but the proposal was again refused passage.
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55 See Judiciary Committee Minutes of 1953, on file in the office of the Clerk
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56 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 230 (1957).
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III. CONCLUSION
It appears that the principles behind the proposition allowing
contribution between negligent tortfeasors are sound and slowly
becoming accepted in this country. It is the duty of the various
Legislatures to recognize the need for a statute of this type. The
courts are slow to overturn such a deeply rooted doctrine and as
the concept behind the "no contribution" rule is no longer justified,
it is up to the Legislature to correct the situation.
Nebraska's exact position as regards contribution between joint
tortfeasors is unsettled. The cases decided on this question are susceptible of various interpretations. Until the Supreme Court clearly
decides the issue, or the Legislature settles the problem, Nebraska's
position will have to remain one of individual interpretation. However, it is suggested that on the basis of past decisions Nebraska
should be put in that group of states that has recognized and allowed contribution between joint tortfeasors where they were acting in good faith and not as intentional wrongdoers. If such a position is not tenable it is further suggested that Nebraska should,
even in the absence of a legislative enactment, adopt the more equitable principle and allow contribution between negligent tortfeasors.
Donald R. Wilson '60

